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Abstract: Since the emergence of GDPR, several industries and sectors are setting informatics 
solutions for fulfilling these rules. The Health sector is considered a critical sector within the 
Industry 4.0 because it manages sensitive data, and National Health Services are responsible for 
managing patients’ data. European NHS are converging to a connected system allowing the 
exchange of sensitive information cross different countries. This paper defines and implements 
a set of tools for extending the reference architectural model industry 4.0 for the healthcare sector, 
which are used for enhancing GDPR compliance. These tools are dealing with data sensitivity 
and data hiding tools A case study illustrates the use of these tools and how they are integrated 
with the reference architectural model. 
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1 Introduction  
The healthcare sector is highly influenced by the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) [The European Parliament And Of The Council, 2016]. This is basically and 
partially due to the fact that healthcare management systems are being supported by 
computers where medical records and personal data are being processed. Systems must 
guarantee some degree of protection to stakeholders and some technologies are being 
used in this sense. Healthcare is being considered as a relevant topic within the Industry 
4.0 [Celesti et al., 2019], which was defined back in 2011 [Pfeiffer, 2017], and it has 
been related to manufacturing or production processes. However, the medical field 
[Javaid and Haleem, 2019] is being considered as a part of Industry 4.0 [Badri et al., 
2018]. In fact, Industry 4.0 and healthcare services [Alloghani et al., 2018] are 
complementary approaches and their integration and interoperability are becoming a 
need. 
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According to [Pang et al., 2018], Industry 4.0 is spilling out from manufacturing to 
healthcare, and the increase of digitally networked and data-intensive are pushing 
forward the smarter production concept and, thus, the industry 4.0 concept.  
Since the emergence of the GDPR, the use of new technologies such as Internet of 
Things (IoT), cloud/fog/edge computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and 
robotics in the medical sector is not banal nor straightforward.  
This industry is moving to an integrated set of digitalized healthcare products and 
digitalized healthcare services. The integration of different technologies with 
healthcare systems is representing a major challenge especially when dealing with 
patients health records [Elhoseny et al., 2018], and its alignment to GDPR rules.  
European citizens are entitled to move freely to different European countries, and 
each country has its own particularities concerning medical treatments and medical data 
management rights [Wismar et al., 2011]. Medical Data management including 
transfers of personal data to third countries or international organizations are major 
subjects within this European law, and mechanisms must be set up for assuring security 
and privacy, especially when managing patient’s health records [The European 
Parliament And The Council Of The European Union, 2011].  
However, the European Commission is promoting a set of services for connecting 
NHS from different countries in order to allow access and exchange European patients’ 
medical records [Hathaliya et al., 2019] abroad. One of these services is the OpenNCP 
[European Commission, n.d.-b] which is a platform connecting National Health 
Services (NHS) cross European countries. Each country is connected throughout a set 
of services to the rest of national contact points in order to create a network for sharing 
patient’s health records. Each NHS has a complex architecture and may be connected 
to Industry 4.0 technologies and/or IoT based architectures.  
The connection of different NHS across Europe is a complex scenario requiring a 
defined and validated framework. Several research works have been done in this sense 
[Staffa et al., 2018], [Health information Institute, 2010], or they are ongoing [EHDEN 
consortium, 2020] in order to solve or to reduce the challenges for the healthcare sector 
[Lezzi et al., 2018]. Taking into account this scenario and our recent published works 
in this sense [Larrucea et al., 2020] and [Assaf et al., 2019]. We have introduced the 
use of policies, a consent management tool, a data hiding tool and a data sensitivity 
tool. Therefore, this paper contributes to this scenario with the following: 
• Policy definition and use of a consent management tool 
• Data Sensitivity tool integration within the healthcare industry 4.0 
architectural model  
• Data hiding tool integration within the healthcare industry 4.0 architectural 
model 
• A case study illustrates the use of the architecture and the use of its related 
tools.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, a background overview on healthcare, 
OpenNCP and GDPR, is provided. Second, the integration of data hiding and data 
sensitive analysis tools within the healthcare industry 4.0 architecture is proposed. 
Next, we define the case study to illustrate the approach. In section Five, we draw 
conclusions and outline future steps.  
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2 Background 
2.1 Security and interoperability in Healthcare information systems 
National healthcare systems are keystones for any country, but its security must be 
enhanced from a security perspective. Nowadays citizens are moving around the world 
travelling from one country into another, and there is an increasing need to provide 
them better support when they are travelling abroad. Therefore, interoperability is a 
challenge in healthcare systems. From a technical point of view, medical doctors must 
have access to patients’ data by using the National Health Service (NHS) in order to 
figure out the patient’s condition for improving diagnosis and treatments. In addition, 
this data must be available but there are several technical barriers such as the 
interoperability of patients’ health records. As stated by [Wismar et al., 2011], NHSs 
are differently managed and implemented within the European Union. Therefore, if we 
want to allow the exchange of health records between countries, we need to provide the 
means for enabling their interoperability. Due to the complex set of systems involved 
within a NHS, we identified a healthcare industry 4.0 architecture [Larrucea et al., 
2020] allowing us to define and use different tools for different purposes, as it was 
defined by the industry 4.0 environment [Schweichhart, 2016]. It’s a relevant layer 
within the reference architectural framework [Schweichhart, 2016].  
From a non-technical point of view, security awareness and training are some of 
the topics to be addressed in healthcare systems because this kind of systems are 
integrating a wide diverse set of technologies such as IoT systems [Pace et al., 2019]. 
As stated previously, there is a large number of initiatives dealing with this topic. 
However, our approach is to build upon the OpenNCP platform [European 
Commission, n.d.-b] a set of tools for enhancing security at data level where patient’s 
health records are exchanged across European countries. This OpenNCP platform is 
supported by the eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure (DSI) Operations [European 
Commission, n.d.-a] directly managed by the European Commission. The purpose of 
the OpenNCP is to provide a common network and an infrastructure to connect 
different national healthcare systems. This initiative was launched by the epSOS project 
[‘Smart Open Services for European Patients’, 2018]. The eHealth DSI (eHDSI) is the 
initial deployment and operation of services for cross-border health data exchange 
under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Each National Contact Points (NCP) for 
eHealth (NCPeH) is deployed in a VM which connects the others VM. In its turn, each 
member state has a complex and different infrastructure connecting the OpenNCP 
[Larrucea et al., 2019].  
 
2.2 GDPR, eHealth records and consent 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [The European Parliament And Of 
The Council, 2016] is a European directive (law) where security aspects related to 
personal data must be enhanced. This is especially relevant in health-based systems 
because they are using personal data. When a European citizen travels abroad, and he 
is moving across European countries, they keep the same rights as in those from their 
origin countries. The management of personal data is considered as one of the main 
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challenges or topics to be addressed. In this context, the consent given by a 
citizen/patient is stressed by the GDPR where a controller must demonstrate that a 
patient gave its consent [The European Parliament And Of The Council, 2016]. This 
consent must be also exchanged among different member states when a patient is being 
assisted by a doctor in other country. The GDPR requires the management of this 
consent and privacy rules [Rios et al., 2019]. As health records are sensitive 
information, governments and agencies must establish the appropriate mechanisms as 
requested by the law. In this context, as patient’s health records [The European 
Parliament And The Council Of The European Union, 2011] are exchanged, they 
should be connected to medical devices, hospitals records, and so on. Medical doctors 
require as much information as possible, and patients’ information must be available.  
GDPR and patients’ health records related directive stress the consent management 
concept which is usually captured and evidenced by a piece of paper. Sometimes there 
is no evidence of the explicit consent, but healthcare systems require to capture the 
informed consent from patients in an explicit way. Consent management systems must 
define a specific consent architecture [Heinze et al., 2011]. 
It is worth to mention the need for connecting the GDPR and the possibilities of 
technological tools in support of legal compliance. This step represents a step forward 
on considering the legislative obligations. There are several research works such as 
[Pocs, 2012] where a legal scholar is dealing with this issue. Another example is 
[Conley and Pocs, 2018] where authors are analyzing the GDPR compliance challenges 
within interoperable health information exchanges. 
3  Healthcare industry 4.0 
3.1 Introduction to Healthcare industry 4.0 Architecture 
As stated previously our work is based on the use of a healthcare industry 4.0 reference 
architecture [Larrucea et al., 2020]. Basically, this architecture defines the following 
layered stack (Figure 1):  
• Business Processes: this layer involves the interaction among the different 
stakeholders to provide an added value to the healthcare industry 4.0 
stakeholders. This layer considers the consent management process to 
illustrate how it works since consent has a relevant role within the current 
regulations such as the GDPR.  
• Functions: to implement consent management functionalities, we need to 
develop and set up processes to (1) identify the sensitive data elements and (2) 
enforce the consent decision – in addition to the consent management tool per 
se. In particular, Healthcare systems must adhere to regulation. During 
interaction between different healthcare systems as well as the explicit consent 
stated by patients.  
• Data: this layer deals with the format of the data exchanged and managed., 
This layer is related to the data required by the OpenNCP architecture. This 
architecture uses HL7 as the standard format. This layer deals with the format 
of the data, and the identification of the data. 
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• Communication: we are using the OpenNCP as a communication channel for 
sharing patients’ information such as eHealth records. We extend the 
OpenNCP to include all different healthcare systems.  
• Digitalization: health records are represented using HL7 and following the 
International Patient Summary guidelines. Scans and other medical results 
such as blood analysis are digitalized.  
• Physical Things: Mobile devices can access health records by using encrypted 
channels. This aspect is not addressed in this paper due to space limitations. 
 
 
Figure 1: Reference Architectural Model Industry 4.0 adopted for the healthcare 
industry 4.0 [Larrucea et al., 2020] 
3.2 Consent Management tool 
Our approach is to use the consent management tool provided by Symphonic 
[‘Symphonic’, 2020], and to create a policy based on this tool. The following Figure 2 
summarizes the main components of the consent management tool.  
 
 
Figure 2: Consent Management tool 
This tool has a Policy Manager containing a set of tools for implementing fine-grained 
and dynamic access control policies. This aspect allows us to govern how the resources 













Model Industrie 4.0 
(RAMI 4.0)
Tools developed and integrated for
enhancing security and privacy in a  
Healthcare Industry 4.0 
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control) system, and it tries to answer the question: "given the facts I know about the 
user, the resource being accessed, what the user wants to do with the resource, how 
sure I am the user is who she says she is, and any other pertinent facts about the world 
at this point in time, should the user's access request be permitted, and is there anything 
else that must be done in addition to permitting or denying access?". 
The following Figure 3 represents an overview of the tool where policies are 
defined and stored.  
 
 
Figure 3: Consent management tool - policies 
This tool is the upper layer of the healthcare industry 4.0 architecture [Larrucea et al., 
2020], and it refers to the consent management which is one of the major issues [Asghar 
et al., 2017] in healthcare systems. Sometimes, remote consent is required when 
patients are travelling, and they are not physically present for giving consent. Consents 
requires the access to patient data [David et al., 2014], and physicians must deal with 
ethics and regulatory aspects such as GDPR. In fact, data processing of health 
information among different actors (e.g. peer to peer) [Weber-Jahnke and Obry, 2012] 
is the other major issue [Asghar et al., 2017], and this is especially relevant in 
emergency contexts [Shapiro et al., 2016] or even in the IoT (Internet of Things). 
Consent and policies [Karat et al., 2009] depend on the context [Russello et al., 2008]. 
In this sense, our approach based on [Buchanan et al., 2013] is to provide an integrated 
set of tools that supports and enables the creation of a formal structure for abstraction, 
governance and implementation of trust relationships and security policies.  
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Figure 4: Business process flow and the interaction among data hiding tools and 
consent management  
Figure 4 summarizes the workflow over two countries, and how the consent and the 
data hiding tool are used. Consent manager reads the patient’s health records, and it 
stores the consent for each patient. Each consent is translated, and it is read by the data 
hiding tool. Then this tool masks the data fields based on the information stored within 
each consent. Afterwards the information is sent to the requested country by using the 
extended OpenNCP functionalitiy. Further explanation about this tool can be obtained 
here [SHiELD project, 2017].  
3.3 Data hiding and data sensitivity tools   
How does the Data hiding tool work? 
The data hiding tool aims at addressing privacy rules related to sharing and storing of 
personal sensitive information – while providing a solution for real-world applications 
and data flows. The tool supports a wide range of data flows shown in the next figure. 
These flows (Figure 5) include: (1) Static data masking in DBs, (2) DB Response 
masking (3) Application layer masking (via proxy) where the traffic is monitored (via 
a proxy) and masked, (4) Log file masking and (5) Data export (e.g. to the cloud) and 
masked. 
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While the use cases span a wide array of architectural and data flow arrangements 
the data hiding tool is designed to address the following common requirements: 
1. Support a wide array of mechanisms to identify and select (sensitive) data 
elements within structured documents (e.g. xml, json, csv, xslx), unstructured 
documents (e.g. text, pdf, docx) as well as composite documents (e.g. HTML 
embedded within XML). 
2. Provide a wide array of masking/unmasking operations including redaction, 
tokenization, encrypt, format preserving tokenization and format preserving 
encryption.to address different needs such as referential integrity and/or 
reversibility.  
3. Support the modification (rewriting) of the payload itself while keeping its 
structure. 
4. Provide the user with fine grained control over the tool behavior, e.g. using a 
policy. 
5. Support for conditional and predicated processing. 
To support these requirements the hiding tool (internally) constructs – based on the 
policy - masking/unmasking ‘engines’. These engines handle (composite) payloads by 
processing the payloads in discrete steps. Essentially creating a flow of data where each 
step handles one aspect of the payload and postpones the rest of the processing for the 
next steps. In the design, we implement the data flow as a directed acyclic graph. The 
graph nodes are responsible for processing a specific type of payload. For example, a 
processor can be responsible to parse a JSON payload or encrypt text. The graph edges 
are responsible for (1) identifying the next processor in the data flow, (2) selecting a 
data element such as a Json element or a CSV Cell, and (3) providing the user with the 
ability to specify whether processing should be performed on the selected value (using 
predicates and conditions) based on additional input and/or the selected value itself. 
To explain the tools, we present an example where the user would like to mask the 
name in the payload depicted in Figure 6. The steps to be taken are the following: 
 
1. Parse XML, select XPath (e.g. "/partial-response/changes/update") 
2. Parse Html, select CSS (e.g. "table > tbody > tr > td:nth-child(2)") 
3. Mask content 
4. Rebuild HTML with updated text 
5. Rebuilt XML with updated element 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<partial-response> 
... <update ...> 
         <![CDATA[ 
       <table ..> ... 
        <td ...">Name</td> 
        <td ...">john doe</td>  
        ..              
       ..</table> ]]> 
    </update> ... 
</partial-response> 
Figure 6: Composite payload masking example 
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These steps are realized using the following processors and selectors 
1. An XML processor that parses XML payloads, support XPath Syntax 
expressions to select XML nodes and support updating of selected nodes.  
2. A HMTL processor that parses HTML payload, support CSS Syntax and 
selectors as well as support updating of selected elements. 
3. A Masking Processor which is able to mask text, e.g. replace text with ‘*’, 
4. An XPath selector that specifies the relevant XPath, and 
5. A CSS selector that specifies the relevant CSS path.  
A graph connecting the described processors and selector is shown in the following 
figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Masking engine instance example 
The hiding tool main interface is a single method called process. This method 
receives the payload, policy and a few more additional arguments and provides as a 
result the processed payload (e.g. masked/unmasked). 
 
 
How does the Data Sensitivity work? 
 
The process of identifying sensitive data is a necessary step to be able to address EU 
GDPR regulation. The first step is to discover the personal data in the organization 
datastores, categorize the data, and finally apply appropriate methods to protect the 
data. Given a category, the organization can adhere to a specific GDPR requirement. 
For example, the GDPR defines special categories such as racial and health data. A 
company must have a legitimate and lawful reason for collecting, storing, transmitting, 
or processing these special categories. 
The Data Sensitivity Analysis Tool addresses the first step. It finds the 
sensitive/personal data in relational databases. The tool is provided with DB tables for 
analysis and a configuration. The configuration allows us to customize the tool and 
select relevant predefined classifiers. In addition, the tool provides the ability to define 
custom classifiers. The tool analyses each one of the tables and provides the table 
categories as well as specific information for each column. This information includes 
the column categories and sub-categories, each attached with a corresponding 
confidence score. 
Internally, the tool utilizes several methods to identify categories. These include 
simple methods – “single value classifiers” - such as regular expression, dictionaries as 
well as methods to check complex restrictions such as Luhn checksum. Instead, the tool 
uses advanced statistical analysis and it is able to account for multiple values in the 
column to differentiate between categories which may have overlapping values. 
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Specifically, this is accomplished by applying different types of statistics which can 
differentiate correctly between the categories. The next figure 8 shows one type of 
statistic able to differentiate between categories based on the distance of the discrete 
distribution of the sample from the one expected for each category. 
 
 
Figure 8: Applying Kullback-Leibler distance on discrete distribution [Assaf et al., 
2019] 
4 Case study 
4.1 General overview 
Our case study is based on the following situation [Larrucea et al., 2020], where a UK 
citizen travelling to Spain incurs a stroke, he/she is taken to the nearest Spanish hospital, 
and medical doctors ask for his/her patient’s electronic health records (EHR). Each 
country has its own NHS, and there is an exchange of data between hospitals. 
 
4.2 Business Processes Layer 
This layer deals with the consent management in a healthcare industry 4.0 context 
where 2 different countries must collaborate and share patient’s health records for 
assisting a patient travelling from one country to another.  
This case study is also based on the case studies reflected in [Larrucea et al., 2019] 
where they use the same situation as a testing example. In this case, a UK citizen 
travelling to Spain incurs a stroke and is taken to the nearest Spanish hospital. While 
receiving first aid from the Emergency Medical Services (EMS), the coordination 
centre informs the EMS in which hospital the patient should be taken to. At the same 
time a message is sent to a workstation located in the emergency department of the 
hospital responsible for alerting the first-aid unit. As soon as the message is received a 
medical team is created for the stroke assistance. To ensure the best assistance, the 
medical staff wishes to check the patient’s electronic health records (EHR) to know 
their medical history (e.g. their epSOS patient summary).  
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From a technical point of view, Figure 9 represents the solution where different 
National Health Systems are interconnected [‘Smart Open Services for European 
Patients’, 2018]. Figure 9 includes the two members of the European Union that are 
connected by using OpenNCP.  Each national OpenNCP installation plays a relevant 
role within the consent management. This business process involves different 
OpenNCP nodes and each node includes a set of functionalities in order to strength data 
security and privacy. Security is a chain and it is as strong as its weakest link and all 
these NHSs are connected by using this platform. 
 
 
Figure 9: Reference Architectural Model Industry 4.0 adopted for the healthcare 
industry 4.0  
Each national contact point has the same set of tools for managing consent, for 
hiding sensitive data, and for secure monitoring (Figure 9). 
Data Layer 
As this layer is central aspect of our resulting platform, we show in Figure 10 the main 
UI for data hiding tool. The UI allows the user to create, manage and test the hiding 
policies. Note, during runtime the data hiding tools’ ‘process’ API is called with the 
policy id and relevant payload. 
Obviously, there are several connections between different tools such as the 
consent manager, the data hiding tool and the extended OpenNCP, but we just want to 
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Figure 10: Data Masking toolkit, policy graph 
Figure 10 shows the policy graph (data flow) created to mask the sensitive data in 
the patient health record. In the following paragraphs we provide an example of the 
outcomes of this tool. 
 
Example of an eHealth record masked  
 
The data hiding tool was used to hide specific data in a Psychiatry Discharge Report 
(XML based) and was configured to account for the consent provided by the user and 
hide only the non-consented information. 
Figure 12 shows a XML example of a clinical document before being processed, and it 
shows the result after the masking tool was invoked. In this case, as a result all attributes 
are encrypted based on the consent. 
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      <component> 
        <section> 
          <templateId root="2.16.840.1.113883.10.20.22.2.15" 
extension="20170509"/> 
          <code code="10157-6" codeSystem="2.16.840.1.113883.6.1"/> 
          <title>ANTECEDENTES FAMILIARES</title> 
          <text> 
            <paragraph>Madre con antecedentes de depresión que requisó 
ingreso hospitalario. Tío materno con esquizofrenia. Tía materna con 
depresión</paragraph> 
          </text> 
        </section> 
      </component> 
      <component> 
… 
Figure 11: An example of the XML unmasked 
 





    <component> 
        <section> 
          <templateId extension="6Caf3Sqq11IWkLHcvAH/yg==" 
root="oRssaWwwV45ZoqEv571KUR27AGBh8vzl2VtOMjiyJI0="/> 
          <code code="phntHMAorf0xd0ujEZStmw==" 
codeSystem="oRssaWwwV45ZoqEv571KUXq8zpTGZhb8iuiNIR7NS+k="/>               
<title>ZiUWkE3R8pE7gyaLyIvQT1KC62AHvAxaZBHahow7sio=</title> 




          </text> 
        </section> 
      </component> 
… 
Figure 12: An example of the XML masked 
Example of a Data Sensitivity work 
We run the Data Sensitivity Analysis tool on consultation table with our case study 
NHS DB. This table contains patient info including many Direct and Indirect (Quasi) 
Personal Identifier information such as name, phone, national id and birth date. The 
purpose was to categorize correctly each of the table columns. The tool found that the 
table contains both Direct and Indirect (Quasi) Personal Identifiers. In addition, for each 
column it provides its category and subcategories.  
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Figure 13 displays part of the JSON result for the consultation table. As illustrated, 
the consultation table contains both Direct Identifier and Quasi Identifier columns. The 
HCP_ID column is identified as a Quasi Identifier and the results show a high likely-
hood (confidence score of 0.9) that it contains sensitive information.  
 
 
Figure 13: JSON result for the consultation table 
5 Conclusions 
The GDPR is being considered as a fundamental requirement in any software system 
managing or processing personal information. Our industry 4.0 architecture and our set 
of tools such as consent management, data sensitivity and data hiding tools are key 
elements for fulfilling with GDPR requirements. These articles are the followings:  
• “Article 5. Principles relating to processing of personal data”. In fact, the 
medical records exchanged are collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes  
• “Article 6 Lawfulness of processing”. In our solution patients have given 
consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific 
purposes. In addition, our data hiding tools are considered as appropriate 
safeguards, which include encryption or pseudonymisation 
•  “Article 7 Conditions for consent”. As we are using a consent management 
tool, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has 
consented to processing of his or her personal data. 
• “Article 8 Conditions applicable to child's consent in relation to information 
society services”. This is a special case which can be tackled with our solution. 
• “Article 9 Processing of special categories of personal data”. This is the case 
for medical records.  
"tables": { 
  "name": "consultation", 
  "categories": [ 
  { "category": "Direct Identifier", 
    "score": 1.0}, 
  { "category": "Quasi Identifier", 
   "score": 1.0 }], 
 
“columns”: [ 
{ "name": "HCP_ID", 
  "category": { 
     "category":"Quasi Identifier", 
     "score":0.9}, 
   "subCategories": [ 
    { "category": "Region", 
      "score": 0.9 }] 
} … 
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The use of our approach is a step forward for the current development of the 
OpenNCP platform. We are providing a way to enhance security and privacy between 
different NHS from different countries, and to enhance compliance to GDPR 
processing and managing patients’ data. We have defined and used consent manager 
and the data hiding tool for sharing health records, and we have used a healthcare 
industry 4.0 reference framework. 
Our case study illustrates some of the real-world complexities and how the 
approach we took can address those complexities. This includes identifying and 
categorizing the information that is subject to GDPR and consent, integrating the 
consent manager and data hiding tool within the data flow while providing the user fine 
grained control over his personal data. 
As a future work, we are working on the exchange of patients’ data originating 
from mobile devices, and on how to integrate them into NHS, and on how to prevent 
data breaches within this complex scenario. 
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